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884101.1 Introduction
In most OECD countries like all G 7 members the concept of comprehensive in-
come as tax base is applied. In case of capital income real-world tax systems treat
interest, dividends, and capital gains asymmetrically. They are not only taxed with
different rates, with the tax rate on capital income being usually much lower,1 but
capital gains are also taxed at the point of time of their realization whereas inter-
est taxes must be paid by accrual. This asymmetric taxation in combination with
an increasing diffusion and use of new ﬁnancial derivative instruments generates
serious tax arbitrage problems (see i.e. Plambeck, Rosenbloom and Ring, 1995,
Alworth, 1998, Mintz, 2000). For example, the realization principle can be used
by constructing tax straddles and realizing losses at once, receiving tax credits
and postponing gains of the same amount (Constantinides, 1983, Stiglitz, 1983).
In order to postpone capital gains derivatives like future and forward contracts or
options are well suited and enable the tax arbitrageur to avoid conﬂicts with wash-
sales restrictions existing in some tax codes. Another problem of the realization
principle is the lock-in effect which results in suboptimal capital allocations (see
i.e. Feldstein and Yitzhaki, 1978).
One possibility to avoid these problems is to abolish capital taxation and intro-
duce a consumption-based tax system. Another possibility is to maintain the aim
of comprehensive income and correct the deﬁciencies of real-world tax codes.
This could be achieved by the imputed-interest method proposed by Auerbach
(1991, 1992) and Bradford (2000). The retrospective taxation imputes a tax bur-
den on the ex-post hypothetically received interest and compound interest during
the holding period. Therefore the timing option of the realization principle van-
ishes. This method only needs information about the realized capital amount (not
the capital gain), the holding period and the riskless interest rate for each year of
the holding period. The two proposals differ in the treating of risky returns. Brad-
ford (2000) develops a tax formula which taxes the received riskless interest and
incorporates a tax on the risky excess return. He supposes that the tax rate could
1In Germany the tax rate on capital gains is even zero if they aren’t realized within one year.
1therefore be set arbitrarily. Due to Auerbach (1991), the risk premium gener-
ates no utility and therefore should not be taxed. He restricts the imputed-interest
method on taxing the hypothetically accrued riskless interest. In a joint work,
Auerbach and Bradford (2001) present a generalized version of their retrospective
taxation method.
But the question which still remains open is, which method is the better one?
The problem can also be generalized and formulated as: shall the risk premium
be taxed and if so is there any optimal tax rate by which this could be done? This
question is also relevant in case of an interest adjusted income tax which taxes
only the lifetime consumption (see i.e. Rose 1999 or Zodrow 1995, who calls this
method ”individual tax prepayment ITP”). In spite of a huge positive literature on
portfolio effects of taxation on risk-taking there are surprisingly only very little
contributions to the normative questions of optimal risk taxation. Especially the
question of taxing risk premia or not is still unresolved up to date.
The starting point of the literature on risk-taking effects and taxation are the
seminal papers of Mossin (1968), Stiglitz (1969), and Sandmo (1969). They
isolated for the two-asset case in a partial model a risk-inducing substitution ef-
fect and a wealth-elasticity dependent income effect. Sandmo (1977) generalized
some important results to the case of several risky assets. An excellent survey
at the risk-taking literature can be found in Sandmo (1985). Buchholz and Kon-
rad (2000) examine also the case of decreasing returns to scale and information
asymmetries. Konrad (1991) considers risk, taxes, and induced risk-taking effects
in a general-equilibrium model. A survey on earlier approaches to optimal tax-
ation delivers Allingham (1972). The most important articles in this normative
area are Richter (1992) and Christiansen (1993, 1995). Richter (1992) establishes
in a two-asset world an elasticity rule for the optimal taxation of the risky asset.
Christiansen (1993) develops a very similar rule and shows that the uniform tax-
ation of the risky and the safe asset is optimal only for very special assumptions.
Christiansen (1995) characterizes the ﬁrst-best solution for state-contingent lump
sum taxes.
2The ﬁrst two papers imply at least implicitly in their analysis that the risk pre-
mium should be taxed at a positive tax rate. Unfortunately all these results are
derived in models which are not appropriate to answer the question, because the
risk premium is always taxed inter alias with the save return on the risky asset
by the same tax rate. But as we know there are at least as much independent in-
struments necessary as independent goals should be realized. In the most simple
two-period two-asset portfolio models, tax income is used to ﬁnance the provision
of a public good which allows to shift risk from the risk averse private sector to
the risk-neutral public sector and thus ceteris paribus increases welfare. Otherwise
the tax destroys the Pareto-efﬁciency of the allocation and thus ceteris paribus de-
creases welfare. The optimum is characterized by an allocation where both effects
are balanced. Thus, the tax rate on the risky asset and therefore on the risk pre-
mium combines the efﬁciency and risk shifting effect on the expense of an answer
if the risk premium should or should not be taxed.
In what follows we present a simple two-period two-asset portfolio model
which is due to the use of a slightly different tax system than in other papers
appropriate to answer the question if risk premium should be taxed or not. There-
fore we will use the Richter-Christiansen model and introduce a new tax system.
We are able to reproduce some of the risk-taking results as well as some results of
Richter (1992) and Christiansen (1993).
The proceeding of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we establish the
model, characterize in Section 3 the household decision and examine the welfare-
maximization problem the government has to solve in Section 4. Finally we an-
alyze the optimal tax rate on the risk premium. The paper closes with some con-
clusions.
32 The model
We apply a two-period model with homogenous investors (or one representative
investor) and only two assets in order to concentrate on the efﬁciency considera-
tions and on the risk shifting effect of taxing the risk premium. One asset yields
a safe return of r > 0 which is assumed to be given exogenously. The other as-
set’s return, ˜ x ∈ [−1,¥], is state dependent with a probability distribution F(˜ x).
We abstract for uncertain inﬂation that renders the real rate of return of asset 1
uncertain. This assumption seems reasonable in order to analyze the effects of
taxing assets in different risk classes.2 To keep things as simple as possible, we
suppose that Fisher separability is fulﬁlled, and hence savings can be determined
independently of the portfolio choice decision.3
As we are only interested in the latter, we do not model the saving decision of
the household. Instead, the investor has an exogenously given initial wealth which
she completely invests in one or in both assets available in the ﬁrst period. Private
consumption in the second period is ﬁnanced by the principal and the return of
the former investment. There is also a public good g provided by the government
and ﬁnanced out of tax revenue in Period 1. As we suppose that all households
are small and the overall population size is normalized to 1 in the aggregate, they
take the provision of the public good as given and independent of their individual
behavior. Thus all prices are treated parametrically.
Denote initial wealth as W0 and the investment in the risky asset as a. The
household budget constraint in Period 1 is then
˜ W1 = (˜ x−r)·a+(1+r)·W0− ˜ g. (1)
The household maximizes a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that
is supposed to be additive separable in the consumption of the public good. This
2The safe asset can be interpreted as an indexed government bond. Nowadays for example
indexed bonds are available on the capital market.
3This assumption requires special assumptions concerning the utility function. See i.e. Dr` eze
and Modigliani (1972) or Sandmo (1974).
4assumption is crucial because the public good affects the investment decision only
by the way of the amount necessary to ﬁnance it. The utility function is written as
W =U( ˜ W1)+V(˜ g). (2)
Partial derivatives are supposed to fulﬁll UW > 0, Vg > 0, UWW < 0, Vgg < 0. So,
the investors are risk averse in their wealth of private and public consumption.
So far, our model is in line with the analysis of Richter (1992) and Christiansen
(1993). But the tax system we implement is different from the ones formerly used.
All preceding papers either tax the safe return with one tax rate and the complete
return of the risky asset with another tax rate or concentrate on a net tax, which
corresponds to a consumption tax (see for example Sandmo, 1977, Richter, 1992).
In our model we divide the random return of the risky asset in a safe part which
yields a rate of r and the risk premium (˜ x−r) paid by the market. The safe return
of both assets is then taxed at ratet0 and a tax ratet1 is applied to the risk premium.
Thereby we assume full loss offset.
In the next section we show that from the point of view of a representative
investor the tax on the market risk premium is equivalent to taxing the preference
dependent risk premium of an investor. The advantage of this tax system is that
we have one tax rate for safe income and another for the income resulting from
incurring risk. So we are able to calculate an optimal tax rate that applies solely
to the risk premium. We can therefore answer the question if the risk premium
should be taxed – or not. Furthermore the tax rate t0 on the save return in both
assets is in fact a wealth tax and is equivalent to a lump-sum tax, here.
The budget constraint of the government can then be written as
˜ g =t1·(˜ x−r)·a+t0·r·W0. (3)
As long as t1 6= 0, ˜ g is a stochastic variable.
Inserting the government budget constraint (3) in the budget constraint of the
household (1) gives
˜ W1 = (1−t1)·(˜ x−r)·a+(1+(1−t0)·r)·W0. (4)
5Private consumption in t = 1 is ﬁnanced completely out of ˜ W1.
This is a three stage game and the timing of events is as follows. At ﬁrst, the
government sets the optimal tax rates for a given probability distribution of risky
return ˜ x and considers the behavior of the households. Second, for the resulting
expected after-tax returns, the households maximize utility by choosing their op-
timal risky investment a. Finally, the uncertainty vanishes and ˜ x realizes. We
can solve the problem backwards. First, we focus on the household maximization
problem for given tax rates, and then use these results for welfare maximization
by setting optimal tax rates at the government stage.
3 Household Decision
The household chooses a to maximize her expected utility for a given value of ¯ g











U((1−t1)·(˜ x−r)·a+(1+(1−t0)r)·W0)· f(˜ x)·d˜ x+V (¯ g)

(5)
The ﬁrst order condition simpliﬁes to
E[UW ·(˜ x−r)] = 0, (6)





in case of an interior optimum. By the assumption E[˜ x] > r, an interior solution is
guaranteed (see Arrow, 1970).
From (6) it follows that the representative investor increases a as long as the
expected marginal utility of wealth evaluated with the risk premium is positive.
In the optimum the investors balances risk and reward of the risky asset. To make
this point clearer we show that the tax on the market risk premium equals a tax on
6the risk premium of the representative investor. The FOC can also be written as
E[UW · ˜ x] = E[UW]·r.
Applying E[x·y] = E[x]·E[y]+Cov(x,y) gives




The right hand side of equation (8) is the risk premium of the representative
investor.4 In the optimum, this risk premium must be equal to the risk premium
paid by the capital market. This result is not surprising, but it is clear that taxing
the market risk premium taxes the individual preference-dependent risk premium
of an investor.
We can now derive some results of the positive theory of taxation and risk-
taking.
Proposition 1:
(a) The tax t1 on the risk premium generates only a substitution effect with
respect to the investment in the risky asset, and we get ¶a
¶t1 = a
1−t1.
(b) The tax t0 on the safe return exhibits an income effect which depends on the
risk – wealth elasticity h and takes the form da
dt0 = − r·a
1+(1−t0)·r ·h.




. Dividing this expression by the SOC and multiplying by (-
1)we arrives at ¶a
¶t1 = a
1−t1.
The proof of part (b) is somewhat more difﬁcult. Implicit differentiation of the
FOC concerning t0 delivers da
dt0 = −
E[UWW·(˜ x−r)·(−rW0)]
E[UWW·(1−t1)·(˜ x−r)2]. The implicit differential




Rearranging this expression and inserting results in da








4See also Christiansen (1993), S. 59f.
7Proposition 1 (a) is counterintuitive on ﬁrst sight. Taxing the risk premium
more heavily leads to higher investment into the risky asset. This effect follows
from the preferences of the investor for a certain risk position. Increasing the tax
rate on the risk premium distorts this risk position by shifting risk from the private
sector to the public sector. To establish her desired risk position again the investor
raises her investment in the risky asset.5 Thus, the representative investors holds
pre- and post-tax the same revenue-risk-position and a∗ = a
1−t1. The tax on the
risk premium is almost the same as an income tax in case of a safe return rate of
zero. As this tax also does not alter the budget constraint, we get the same result
as in the standard analysis for this special case. The social risk-taking always in-
creases with the tax rate t1, whereas private risk-taking keeps constant. The effect
of t0 on absolute private risk-taking is qualitatively very similar to the case of a
tax applying onto initial wealth (see Stiglitz, 1969, proposition 1b).6
4 Welfare Maximization and Optimal Income Tax-
ation
We characterize the optimal income tax policy by maximizing a social welfare
function for a balanced budget tax reform which seeks to keep the level of the
provision of the public good constant in expected values. This problem can be
motivated pictorially: The government (or a single secretary) sets exogenously an
arbitrary level of public expenditure for social policy measures. The secretary of
ﬁnance then tries to ﬁnance this requirements as efﬁcient as possible in expected
values.
We start by characterizing a ﬁrst best welfare optimum using state dependent
5Obviously in this context the assumption of ˜ x being independent of a and of unconstrained
risky investment is only reasonable for tax rates much smaller than 100 %. But in case of short
sale restrictions and a ≤W0
da
dt1 will be zero if the risky investment a reachesW0.
6Stiglitz uses the concept of absolute risk aversion. Increasing (decreasing) risk aversion cor-
responds to a risk wealth elasticity smaller (greater) than one.
8lump sum taxes Ti.7 Therefore, we differentiate the welfare function totally, and
set it equal to zero. Thus the optimum is characterized by a situation where no
inﬁnitesimal change of endogenous variables can increase welfare any further.









= E[U ((˜ x−r)·a+(1+r)·W0−Ti)]+E[V (˜ g)] (9)
Also the budget constraint has to be taken into account:
˜ g = Ti. (10)
Differentiating totally, we get:
dW = E[UW ·((˜ x−r)·da−dTi)]+E[Vg·d ˜ g] (11)
d ˜ g = dTi (12)
Substituting (12) in (11) gives
dW = E[UW ·(−d ˜ g+(˜ x−r)·a)]+E[Vg·d ˜ g] (13)
and by using the FOC of an household (6) we get for an optimum
dW = E[(Vg−UW)·d ˜ g]
= (E[Vg]−E[UW])·E[d ˜ g]+Cov[Vg,d ˜ g]−Cov[UW,d ˜ g] = 0. (14)
Proposition 2:
(a) The marginal social net revenue of an optimal tax equals the difference
between the expected marginal utility of public and private consumption:
(E[Vg]−E[UW])·E[d ˜ g]
7Using state dependent lump-sum taxes means, the government sets ex ante for each possible
realization xi of ˜ x a conditional lump-sum tax Ti. The subscript i indicates then different states.
So, the tax revenue also depends on ˜ x. See also Christiansen (1993), p. 73f.
9(b) Taxes affect the allocation of public and private consumption in every state.
Thus a risk-shifting effect between private and public consumption occurs.
The net-effect is represented by the difference between the covariances:
Cov(Vg,d ˜ g)−Cov(UW,d ˜ g)
In contrast to the uniform taxation of interest revenues per asset, tax policy
has no welfare effect through variation in portfolio for state dependent lump sum
taxes. If there are portfolio distortion costs, the optimal taxation is a trade off
between efﬁcient risk allocation and the welfare loss stemming from the portfolio
effect.
Now we are able to analyze the optimal income tax policy. We assume a bal-
anced budget tax reform where the government keeps the provision of the public
good constant in expected terms. As the budget must be balanced in every state of
nature, the realization of ˜ g varies and depends still on the realization of ˜ x.
Total differentiation of the government’s budget condition gives
d ˜ g = r·W0·dt0+(˜ x−r)·a·dt1+t1·(˜ x−r)·da. (15)
From the balanced budget condition we get that (15) must be equal to zero in
expected values. Therefore, we get
E[d ˜ g] = r·W0·dt0+E[(˜ x−r)]·a·dt1+t1·E[(˜ x−r)]·da = 0. (16)
















Using a = a(t1) as the optimal response of an household to a tax rate t1 (see
Proposition 1) andt0 =t0(t1) from the balanced budget condition (17) we can state
the social maximization problem as follows:
max
t1
{W = E[U ((1−t1)·(˜ x−r)·a(t1)+(1+(1−t0(t1))·r)·W0)]+E[V(˜ g)]
s.t. ˜ g =t1·(˜ x−r)·a(t1)+t0(t1)·r·W0} (18)


































































































= 0 only if t1 → ¥ which gener-
ates a minimum. So, social welfare is maximized, if
Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = Cov(Vg,(˜ x−r)). (22)
We are now able to conclude:
Proposition 3:
It is never optimal to use solely the lump sum tax t0 to ﬁnance the public good and
not to tax the risk premium.
11Proof:
Suppose the case t1 = 0. Then, the governmental budget constraint does not de-
pend on the risky return ˜ x. So, g is deterministic and Vg is ﬁxed. Therefore,
Cov(Vg,(˜ x−r)) = 0. From (22) then follows Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = 0. This is only
possible for eitherUW = constant and the households being risk neutral in private
consumption, which conﬂicts with our general assumptions, or for t1 = 1, which
contradicts the initial assumption t1 = 0. 2
The intuition behind this is straightforward. If we use only the lump sum tax
we have a ﬁxed level of g and get ex ante UW = Vg in expected terms. Ex post
the actual marginal utility of private consumption depends on the realization of ˜ x.
Then, it is optimal to have in bad states a lower level of g and in good states a
higher one. But this can be efﬁciently8 reached by linking public expenditure to
the realization of ˜ x by taxing the risk premium (˜ x−r) with t1 > 0.
In the special case of households being risk neutral in public consumption is
Vg = constant and (22) simpliﬁes to
Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = 0. (23)
Proposition 4:
If the households are risk neutral in public consumption the optimal tax rate on
the risk premium is t1 = 1.
Proof:
For t1 = 1:
˜ W = 1+r(1−t0)·W0 ∀˜ x =⇒UW = const.∀˜ x =⇒ Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = 0
2
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as simple as surprising. By using the
tax on the risk premium with t1 = 1 and full loss offset all the aggregate risk is
concentrated in the public consumption. As the households are risk neutral in ˜ g
8Here, efﬁciently means in accordance with optimal risk allocation.
12they do not worry about this risk. As further the portfolio choice is not distorted
there are no costs in risk shifting. The lump sum tax t0 is used only to balance the
budget and if ˜ g is set optimally to equate the expected values of marginal utilities
in private and public consumption.
If the households are risk averse in public consumption, too,Vg will depend on
realization of ˜ x and so, Cov(Vg,(˜ x−r))<0 asVgg <0. Therefore, in the optimum
Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = Cov(Vg,(˜ x−r)) (24)
must still hold. This is only possible, if t1 ∈ (0;1).
Proposition 5:
If households are risk averse in public consumption, there is an optimal tax rate
t1 with 0 <t1 < 1.
As the households are risk averse both in private and public consumption, the
risk must be diversiﬁed between both aspects in an optimum. This diversiﬁcation
depends on the relative strength of the risk aversion in private consumption com-
pared to the one in public consumption. Therefore, the tax rate t1 depends on this
relative risk aversion. The higher the relative strength of risk aversion in private
consumption, the higher will be the tax rate on the risk premium. Thus, only if
the households are risk neutral in private consumption and risk averse in public
consumption the risk premium should not be taxed.
Compared with the ﬁrst best optimum using state dependent lump sum taxes
our tax system delivers the same condition for optimal risk allocation as in Propo-
sition 2. To see this, recognize, that E[d ˜ g] = 0 and by using (15), (16)
d ˜ g = d ˜ g−E[d ˜ g] = (a·dt1+t1·da)(˜ x− ¯ x) (25)
with ¯ x = E[˜ x]. Then,
Cov(UW,d ˜ g) = Cov(UW,(a·dt1+t1·da)(˜ x− ¯ x)) (26)
and the same applies to Cov(Vg,d ˜ g). Further, Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = Cov(UW, ˜ x).
13Using some basic covariance rules, it follows
Cov(Vg,d ˜ g) = Cov(UW,d ˜ g) (27)
⇔ Cov(UW,(a·dt1+t1·da)(˜ x− ¯ x)) = Cov(Vg,(a·dt1+t1·da)(˜ x− ¯ x))
⇔ (a·dt1+t1·da)·Cov(UW,(˜ x− ¯ x)) = (a·dt1+t1·da)·Cov(Vg,(˜ x− ¯ x))
⇔ Cov(UW, ˜ x) = Cov(Vg, ˜ x)
⇔ Cov(UW,(˜ x−r)) = Cov(Vg,(˜ x−r)). (28)
So, if we assume that the public good g is set optimally and the lump sum tax
on safe interest income t0 is used to equate the expected marginal utilities, we get
the same result as in a ﬁrst best optimum. The reason is that we have no portfolio
distortion effect and achieve optimal risk allocation by using the tax on the risk
premium. Furthermore, it should be clear that equalizing tax rates in manner of a
comprehensive income taxation can lead only in special cases to an optimum.
5 Conclusion
As we are not able to use state contingent lump-sum taxes, we are in a second-
best world. In such a world we showed for a balanced budget tax reform that a
positive taxation of the risk premium is optimal and the resulting risk shifting can
be done without any portfolio distortion costs by using a positive tax rate on the
risk premium. Therefore, the risk allocation is efﬁcient. The tax on the safe mar-
ket rate of return in both assets is used solely in order to balance the budget and
to equate the expected marginal utilities of private and public consumption. In a
nutshell, we can mimic a ﬁrst best solution given the assumptions of our model.
If the households are risk neutral in public consumption it is even optimal to tax
the risk premium fully. So, private consumption is deterministic in this case and
all risk is optimally concentrated at the public good.
Taxing the risk premium has consequences for the design of a timing-neutral
capital gains tax system ` a la Auerbach-Bradford, too. The ﬁrst proposal was tax-
ing solely the imputed safe rate of return (Auerbach, 1991) then they developed
14a generalized tax system incorporated some risk tax (Auerbach and Bradford,
2001). As the risk premium should be taxed in an optimum the suggestion of
Auerbach that the risk premium should not be taxed can’t be veriﬁed. We are able
to state now, that the second and, I’m afraid, more complicated proposal for a ret-
rospective capital gains taxation is potentially optimal. Our results further support
the suggestion that in an interest adjusted tax system the extraordinary gains ˜ x−r
should be taxed. The tax rate hereby need not be equal to the tax rate on wage
income. If they are identical we have a comprehensive income tax, but, as shown,
in an optimal tax scenario this can happen only by pure chance.
Due to the simplicity of our model further research is needed. Obviously a
more sophisticated model should take account of an intertemporal consumption
decision. Furthermore the interest rates should be endogenized in a next step.
Supposing the returns as ﬁxed is acceptable in a small open economy and an
integrated perfect world capital market. But, we are then not in a position to make
conclusions concerning over- or under-investment in the risky asset.
Other possibilities to expand the paper are using a model with more than two
periods and integrating more than two assets. But we think that at least expanding
the amount of assets would not alter our result.
6 References
Allingham, M. G. (1972). Risk Taking and Taxation. Zeitschrift f¨ ur National-
¨ okonomie 32, 203-224.
Alworth, J. (1998). Taxation and Integrated Financial Markets: The Challenges
of Derivatives and Other Financial Innovations. International Tax and Pub-
lic Finance 5, 507-534.
Arrow, K. J. (1970). Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
15Auerbach, A. J. (1991). Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation. American Eco-
nomic Review 81, 167-178.
Auerbach, A. J. (1992). On the Design and Reform of Capital-Gains Taxation.
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 263-267.
Auerbach, A. J. and D. F. Bradford (2001). Generalized Cash Flow Taxation.
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 425, M¨ unchen.
Bradford, D. F. (2000). Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency
and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments. In: Bradford,
David F. (ed.), Taxation, Wealth and Saving, MIT-Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
371-428.
Buchholz, W. and K. Konrad (2000). Risiko und Steuern. In: Andel, Norbert
(Hrsg.), Probleme der Besteuerung III. Schriften des Vereins f¨ ur Socialpoli-
tik, Gesellschaftf¨ urWirtschafts-undSozialwissenschaften, N.F.Bd. 259/III,
Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 63-139.
Constantinides, G. M. (1983). Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax.
Econometrica 51, 611-636.
Christiansen, V. (1993). A Normative Analysis of Capital Income Taxes in the
Presence of Aggregate Risk. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance
Theory 18, 55-75.
Christiansen, V. (1995). Normative Aspects of Differential, State-Contingent
Capital Income Taxation. Oxford Economic Papers 47, 286-301.
Dr` eze, J.H.andF.Modigliani(1972). ConsumptionDecisionunderUncertainty.
Journal of Economic Theory 5, 308-335.
Feldstein, M. and S. Yitzhaki (1978). The Effects of the Capital Gains Tax on
the Selling and Switching of Common Stock. Journal of Public Economics
9, 17-36.
16Konrad, K. (1991). Risk Taking and Taxation in Complete Markets. The Geneva
Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 16, 167-177.
Mintz, J. (2000). Taxation of Investment and Finance in an International Setting:
Implications for Tax Competition. CoFE Diskussion Paper 00/33, Univer-
sit¨ at Konstanz, Konstanz.
Mossin, J. (1968). Taxation and Risk Taking: An Expected Utility Approach.
Economica 35, 74-82.
Plambeck, C. T., H. D. Rosenbloom and D. M. Ring (1995). General Report.
Tax aspects of derivative ﬁnancial instruments, Cahier de Droit Fiscal Inter-
national, 653-690.
Richter, W. F. (1992). The Optimal Taxation of Risky Capital Income: An Elas-
ticity Rule. Journal of Economics 55, 101-112.
Rose, M. (1999). Recommendations on Taxing Income for Countries in Tran-
sition to Market Economies. M. Rose (ed.), Tax Reform for Countries in
Transition to Market Economies. Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart.
Sandmo, A. (1969). Capital Risk, Consumption and Portfolio Choice. Econo-
metrica 37, 586-599.
Sandmo, A. (1974). Two-Period Models of Consumption Decisions under Un-
certainty: a survey. In: Dr` eze, Jacques H. (ed.), Allocation under Uncer-
tainty: Equilibrium and Optimum, Macmillian Press, London.
Sandmo, A. (1977). Portfolio Theory, Asset Demand and Taxation: Comparative
Statics with Many Assets. Review of Economic Studies 49, 517-528.
Sandmo, A. (1985). The effects of Taxation on Savings and Risk Taking. In:
Auerbach, Alan J. and Martin Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Eco-
nomics Vol. I, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 265-311.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1969). The Effects of Income, Wealth and Capital Gains Taxation
on Risk-taking. Quarterly Journal of Economics 83, 262-283.
17Stiglitz, J. E. (1983). Some aspects of the taxation of capital gains, Journal of
Public Economics 21, pp. 257-294.
Zodrow, G. R., (1995). Taxation, uncertainty and the choice of a consumption
tax base. Journal of Public Economics 58, 257-265.
18